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How	 Can	 Competitiveness	 be	 Achieved	 in	 post-Crisis	 Europe:	
Deregulating	Employment	Relations	or	Enhancing	High	Performance	
Work	Practices?	
Abstract:	The	 recent	Eurozone	 crisis	 has	 reinvigorated	neoliberal	 policies	 and	brought	 to	 the	 fore	 an	 academic	 and	 policy	 debate	 over	 the	 deregulation	 of	employment	 relations’	 institutions	 ‘in	 the	 name	 of	 competitiveness’.	 In	 the	context	 of	 this	 debate,	 we	 ask	 the	 following	 question:	 have	 firms	with	employment	 relations	 institutions	been	 less	 able	 to	 improve	productivity	during	 the	 crisis?	 We	 consider	 this	 question	 by	 examining	 data	 from	 the	European	Company	Survey.	We	also	 look	 into	different	models	of	 capitalism	to	gauge	whether	 there	are	 context-specific	 institutional	 effects	 that	may	mediate	firm-level	 outcomes.	 Contrary	 to	 the	dominant	neoliberal	 discourse,	we	do	not	find	 any	 strong	 evidence	 that	 employment	 relations	 institutions	 are	 negatively	associated	 with	 productivity	 increases.	 Instead,	 we	 find	 that	 certain	 high	performance	 work	 practices	 are	 positively	 and	 significantly	 associated	 with	productivity	 increases	 across	 EU-15	 and	 in	 particular	 institutional	 contexts.	Taken	together	these	results	challenge	the	neoliberal	‘low	road’	policies	that	are	focused	 on	 dismantling	 employment	 relations	 institutions	 and	 suggest	 shifting	the	attention	towards	context-sensitive	‘high	road’	policies	and	practices.	
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Introduction	
There	is	surprising	consensus	among	scholars	and	commentators	that	the	recent	crisis	 has	 been	 ‘the	 greatest	 crisis	 of	 capitalism	 most	 of	 us	 have	 seen	 in	 our	lifetime’	(Morgan	et	al.,	2011:	150).	Scholars	are	puzzled	by	how	quickly	the	US	Wall	Street	collapse	mutated	into	a	Eurozone	state	debt	crisis,	thus,	shifting	the	discourse	 of	 blame	 from	 irresponsible	 financialization,	 onto	 state’s	 excessive	borrowing	and	reckless	spending.	With	the	exception	of	a	short	period	that	the	debate	was	 focused	 on	 containing	 unfettered	markets,	 neoliberalism	has	 come	back	with	vengeance	(Crouch,	2011;	Heyes	et	al.,	2012).	
Despite	 the	 subtle	 differences	 among	 variants	 of	 neoliberalism	 (Crouch,	2011),	 neoliberal	 ideas	 typically	 blame	 employment	 relations	 (henceforth:	 ER)	institutions,	 such	 as	 representative	 unions	 and	 collective	 bargaining,	 for	worsening	 competitiveness.	 Therefore,	 flexibility	 and	 deregulation	 are	promulgated	as	the	best	recipe	for	competitiveness	in	many	European	countries	and	at	the	European	Union	(EU)	level	(Hyman,	2001:	289;	Monastiriotis,	2005).	However,	 the	 evidence-base	 for	 these	 claims	 is	 rather	 weak	 and	 inconclusive	(ITUC,	 2013).	 To	 contribute	 to	 this	 debate,	 we	 set	 out	 to	 ask	 the	 following	question:	have	firms	with	ER	institutions	been	less	able	to	improve	productivity	during	the	crisis?	
To	address	this	question	we	develop	and	examine	hypotheses	that	hold	ER	institutions	 as	 responsible	 for	 deteriorating	 productivity.	 Additionally,	 we	develop	 alternative	 hypotheses	 that	 look	 at	 the	 relationship	 between	 high	
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performance	 work	 practices	 and	 productivity.	 Methodologically,	 the	 paper	analyses	data	from	the	European	Company	Survey	(ECS)	2009,	a	pan-European	establishment-level	survey.	The	ECS	dataset	is	most	suitable	for	our	analysis	for	several	reasons:	(1)	the	dataset	was	collected	in	2009,	which	was	the	year	with	the	 deepest	 slump	 for	 most	 European	 economies,	 and	 this	 gives	 us	 valuable	insights	for	the	relationships	in	the	context	of	the	economic	crisis;	(2)	it	is	a	very	rich	 dataset	with	 information	 on	 a	wide	 range	 of	 relevant	 ER	 institutions	 and	work	 practices,	 i.e.	 suitable	 for	 the	 questions	 we	 ask	 and	 also	 offers	 further	information	 that	 allows	 to	 control	 for	 other	 effects;	 (3)	 it	 is	 suitable	 for	comparative	 research	 because	 it	 uses	 a	 questionnaire	 developed	 by	 expert	methodologists,	which	is	standardized	across	European	countries;	(4)	it	contains	several	 thousand	 observations	 from	 different	 industry	 and	 country	 contexts,	thus,	allowing	for	more	generalizable	conclusions.		
We	 focus	 on	 the	 EU-15	 countries1	and	 we	 examine	 research	 hypotheses	using	 ordered-probit	 regression	 analysis.	 The	 aim	 is	 twofold.	 First,	 we	 aim	 to	consider	 the	 relationship	 between	 ER	 institutions	 and	 work	 practices	 with	productivity	 using	 the	 EU-15	 as	 a	 relatively	 homogeneous	 sample.	 Second,	we	aim	to	explore	the	same	hypotheses	across	clusters	of	capitalism,	so	as	to	gauge	whether	 there	 are	 any	 context-specific	 institutional	 effects	 that	 may	 mediate	firm-level	outcomes.	
The	rest	of	the	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	The	second	section	sets	the	scene	by	discussing	the	link	between	deregulation	and	the	aim	of	improving	firm	
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competitiveness	 at	 the	 EU	 level	 and	 the	 manifestation	 of	 neoliberal	 policies	across	models	of	European	capitalism.	The	third	section	develops	hypotheses	on	the	basis	of	neoliberal	arguments	about	the	relationship	between	ER	institutions	and	productivity.	Additionally,	it	develops	alternative	hypotheses	on	the	relation	between	 work	 practices	 and	 productivity	 drawing	 on	 the	 High	 Performance	Work	 Systems	 (HPWS)	 literature.	 The	 fourth	 section	 presents	 the	 dataset	 and	outlines	 the	methodology	of	 the	study.	The	 fifth	section	presents	and	discusses	the	 findings	 of	 our	 statistical	 analysis.	 The	 final	 section	 summarises	 the	 key	findings	 of	 this	 article,	 acknowledges	 the	 limitations	 of	 this	 analysis	 and	considers	implications	for	policy	and	practice.	
Competitiveness	 in	 Europe:	 Intensifying	 deregulation	 across	
European	models	of	capitalism	
Ever	since	the	Lisbon	Agenda,	the	pursuit	of	competitiveness	has	been	a	central	part	 of	 the	 EU	 priorities	 and	 policies.	 This	 aim	 was	 reiterated	 in	 the	Commission’s	 Europe	 2020	 strategy,	 where	 competitiveness	 ‘through	 higher	productivity’	formed	one	of	the	pillars	for	the	achievement	of	smart,	sustainable	and	inclusive	growth	(European	Commission,	2010:	12).	The	main	employment-related	 policies	 to	 achieve	 this	 target	 concern	 the	 increase	 in	 flexibility	 in	 the	labour	 market.	 Despite	 the	 lack	 of	 any	 conclusive	 empirical	 evidence	 on	 the	positive	 effects	 of	 deregulation	 or	 the	 negative	 effects	 of	 ER	 institutions	 on	productivity	 (Marginson,	 2015;	 Vergeer	 and	 Kleinknecht,	 2014),	 the	 EU	
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promoted	a	programme	of	labour	market	deregulation	in	which	‘the	central	aim	was	reworking	the	precise	mix	of	labour	market	policies	and	institutions	to	best	reconcile	economic	competitiveness	and	social	solidarity’	(Clasen	et	al.,	2012:	5).	It	was	assumed	that	a	more	flexible	ER	framework	would	allow	the	adjustment	of	labour	supply	to	the	needs	of	the	employers	by	reducing	their	auxiliary	costs	(e.g.	redundancy	costs)	and	improving	response	to	market	changes.	The	EU	aimed	to	facilitate	the	increase	in	flexibility	by	issuing	Country	Specific	Recommendations	(CSRs)	 to	 each	 member-state,	 and	 required	 the	 reform	 of	 national	 collective	bargaining	systems	in	order	to	improve	competitiveness	(Clauwaert,	2014).		
Interestingly,	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 2009	 economic	 crisis	 significantly	accelerated	the	implementation	of	neoliberal	policies	in	Europe.	This	makes	this	exploration	 even	 more	 relevant	 and	 timely,	 since	 some	 Southern	 European	countries	 –such	 as	 Greece	 and	 Portugal–	 were	 obliged	 to	 abruptly	 deregulate	their	 ER	 systems	 to	 improve	 competitiveness	 (Kornelakis	 and	 Voskeritsian,	2014;	 Molina,	 2014).	 The	 main	 aims	 of	 the	 bailout	 packages	 were	 to	 ‘expose	workers	 to	 the	 full	 force	 of	 global	 labour	 market	 competition,	 requiring	[countries]	to	compete	in	low	prices	alone…’	(Crouch,	2014:	13).	Other	Southern	countries,	which	were	not	subject	 to	strict	conditionality	programmes	–such	as	Italy,	 Spain	and	very	 recently	France–	deregulated	 their	ER	 institutions	 for	 the	same	 reason	 (Clauwaert,	 2014;	 Molina,	 2014).	 In	 sum,	 the	 Eurozone	 crisis	intensified	the	deregulation	of	ER	institutions	across	models	of	capitalism	‘in	the	name	of	competitiveness’.	
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Although	the	process	of	deregulation	and	marketization	(Crouch,	2014)	 is	being	more	explicitly	promoted	by	the	EU	in	recent	years,	it	is	by	no	means	new.	The	 trend	 towards	 deregulation	 of	 ER	 institutions	 is	 observed	 in	 a	 number	 of	European	countries;	however,	the	pace	of	deregulation	has	been	variable	across	different	 models	 of	 capitalism.	 While	 there	 is	 no	 universal	 agreement	 on	 the	clustering	 of	 countries,	 several	 scholars	 tend	 to	 agree	 that	 there	 exist	 four	distinct	 models	 of	 capitalism	 in	 Europe:	 the	 Liberal	 Market	 Economies/Anglo-
Saxon	 capitalism,	 the	 Coordinated/Continental	 European	 capitalism,	 the	 Nordic	
Model	 of	 capitalism	 and	 the	 Southern	 European	 Model	 of	 capitalism	 (Amable,	2003;	 Becker,	 2009;	 Hyman,	 2004).	 This	 clustering	 is	 theoretically	 strong	 and	empirically	 robust.	 Theoretically	 it	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	 different	 historical	constellations	 of	 power	 relations	 between	 capital,	 state	 and	 labour	 (Becker,	2009),	 as	 well	 as	 based	 on	 variable	 degrees	 of	 decommodification	 of	 labour	(Hyman,	2004).	Empirically,	 it	 has	been	verified	by	 the	work	of	Bruno	Amable	(2003),	who	used	cluster	analysis	to	come	up	with	this	classification	drawing	on	a	 very	 rich	 dataset	 of	 indicators	 that	 comprise	 the	 different	 institutional	arrangements	 in	 the	 labour	 market,	 welfare	 regime,	 product	 market	 and	corporate	governance.	
The	clustering	of	countries	has	important	implications	for	the	analysis.	To	begin	with,	it	provides	the	opportunity	to	gauge	whether	there	are	any	context-specific	 effects	 that	 may	 alter	 the	 relationship	 between	 ER	 institutions	 and	competitiveness.	One	of	the	key	insights	of	the	models	of	capitalism	literature	is	
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that	 ER	 institutions	 may	 provide	 ‘institutional	 complementarities’	 (Hall	 and	Soskice,	 2001:	 21)	 and	 together	with	 other	 institutions	may	 reinforce	 positive	feedback	 effects,	 which	 would	 increase	 firm	 competitiveness.	 Hence,	 the	relationship	between	ER	institutions	and	firm	competitiveness	may	vary	across	clusters,	 as	 countries	 find	 themselves	 at	 different	 stages	 of	 labour	 market	(de)regulation.	Indeed,	since	the	late	1970s,	the	revival	of	neo-liberal	policies	in	Britain	paved	the	way	 for	 the	deregulation	of	 its	ER	 framework	(Crouch,	2011;	Heyes	et	al.,	2012).	In	the	British	case,	the	deregulation	of	the	labour	market	was	part	 of	 a	 government	 programme	 forcing	marketization	 and	 financialization	 in	every	part	of	the	economy.	Overall,	the	Liberal	Market	economies,	notably	the	UK	and	 Ireland,	 have	 already	 made	 important	 steps	 towards	 greater	 flexibility	 in	their	 labour	markets.	The	 implication	of	 this	 trajectory	 for	our	analysis	may	be	that	 since	ER	 institutions	have	become	very	weak,	 their	hypothesised	negative	effects	on	productivity	may	have	diminished.	
For	this	reason	the	analysis	shall	also	proceed	to	examine	the	relationship	between	ER	institutions	and	productivity	change	in	other	clusters	of	countries.	In	Continental	 European	 capitalist	 countries,	 such	 as	 Germany,	 it	 was	 the	employers	 who	 contributed	 to	 the	 incremental	 erosion	 of	 the	 coordinated	industrial	 relations	 regime	 (Gumbrell-McGormick	 and	 Hyman,	 2013;	 Hassel,	2014).	Despite	the	fact	that	Continental	European	governments	adopted	policies	facilitating	 labour	 market	 deregulation	 ‘in	 the	 name	 of	 competitiveness’	(Marginson,	 2015),	 their	 ER	 institutions	 remain	 much	 stronger	 than	 Liberal	
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market	 capitalist	 countries.	 The	 same	 rationale	 applies	 to	 Nordic	 capitalist	countries,	 in	which	 trade	unions	remain	 important	with	very	high	membership	rates,	 while	 their	 competitiveness	 is	 considered	 as	 world	 leading.	 Finally,	Southern	 European	 capitalist	 countries	 provide	 us	with	 a	 cluster	 that	 exhibits	high	 levels	 of	 collective	 bargaining	 centralization,	 but	 its	 competitiveness	 has	been	historically	low.	
Firm	competitiveness:	Between	institutions	and	practices	
Central	 to	 the	 neoliberal	 arguments	 is	 the	 premise	 that	 ER	 institutions	 hinder	national	 ‘competitiveness’.	 Admittedly,	 competitiveness	 is	 a	 fuzzy	 concept.	 The	World	 Economic	 Forum	 defines	 competitiveness	 very	 broadly	 as	 ‘the	 set	 of	institutions,	 policies	 and	 factors	 that	 determine	 the	 level	 of	 productivity	 of	 a	country’	 (Schwab	 and	 Sala	 i	 Martin,	 2013:	 4).	 More	 helpfully,	 Porter	 (1990)	suggests	 that	 competitiveness	 should	 reflect	high	productivity	measured	either	at	 the	 national,	 sectoral	 or	 establishment-level.	 Indeed,	 establishment-level	productivity	has	been	one	of	 the	standard	measures	of	 firm	competitiveness	 in	the	Human	Resource	Management	(HRM)	literature	(Huselid,	1995).	On	the	basis	of	 the	above,	we	examine	 firm	competitiveness	 through	 the	proxy	of	 improved	productivity	at	the	establishment	level.		
	
We	unpack	the	relations	between	institutions,	practices	and	productivity	in	more	detail	below.	On	the	one	hand,	we	draw	on	economic	and	employment	relations	
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literature	to	examine	the	relationship	between	ER	institutions	and	productivity.	On	the	other	hand,	we	draw	on	the	HPWS	literature	to	deduce	the	relationship	between	selected	work	practices	(performance	pay,	training,	and	teamwork)	and	productivity.	 Schematically,	 the	 first	 group	 of	 testable	 hypotheses	 we	 set	 out	below	corresponds	to	the	‘low	road’	to	firm	competitiveness,	which	is	focused	on	increasing	 flexibility	 by	 deregulating	 employment	 relations	 institutions.	 The	second	 group	 of	 hypotheses	 corresponds	 to	 the	 ‘high	 road’	 to	 firm	competitiveness,	which	is	focused	on	investing	in	the	abilities	and	motivation	of	the	workforce.	
Employment	relations	institutions	and	productivity	
The	 neoliberal	 arguments	 are	 broadly	 premised	 on	 the	 model	 of	 the	‘monopoly	face’	of	unions	(Hayek,	1990).	One	version	of	the	neoliberal	argument	distinguishes	 between	 centralised	 and	 decentralised	 bargaining.	 The	 argument	goes	that	centralised	bargaining	may	inhibit	the	flexibility	of	individual	firms	by	placing	 a	 straightjacket	 on	 them	 and	 ignoring	 company-specific	 needs	(Zagelmeyer,	 2005).	 More	 specifically,	 it	 may	 hinder	 productivity-enhancing	improvements	 in	 work	 organization	 through	 the	 universal	 standards	 that	 are	imposed	(Marginson,	2015:	111).	Instead,	decentralised	bargaining	is	thought	to	be	more	responsive	to	companies’	needs.	This	monolithic	conception	misses	the	point	 that	 the	 institution	 of	 collective	 bargaining	 resembles	 a	 process,	 and	 its	outcome	 is	 not	 pre-determined	 as	 it	 may	 take	 the	 form	 of	 either	 integrative	(positive-sum)	or	distributive	(zero-sum)	bargaining.		
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A	 stronger	 version	 of	 this	 line	 of	 reasoning	 distinguishes	 between	unionised	 and	 non-unionised	 workplaces,	 and	 suggests	 that	 the	 presence	 of	unions	 in	 firms	 (i.e.	 irrespective	 of	 bargaining	 level)	 may	 hinder	 productivity.	This	 reflects	 the	 typical	 neoclassical	 economics	 treatment	 of	 trade	 unions	 as	vested	 interests,	which	exploit	 their	bargaining	power	(e.g.	due	to	skills/labour	shortages)	to	extract	‘rents’	from	employers	(Borjas,	2005).	Trade	unions	might	therefore	 use	 their	 power	 to	 impose	 restrictive	 practices	 on	 output,	 and	 thus	reduce	 productivity.	 One	 example	 might	 be	 the	 so-called	 ‘featherbedding’	practices,	 whereby	 the	 same	 number	 of	 tasks	 is	 shared	 across	 more	 union	members.	 This	 thesis	 ignores	 the	 potential	 for	 alternative	 views	 in	 favour	 of	‘institutional	voice’	effects	(Freeman	and	Medoff,	1984).	
Finally,	the	same	line	of	reasoning	of	‘monopoly	effects’	has	been	applied	to	works	 councils	 (Hirsch	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Works	 councils	 and	 their	 consultation	powers	may	 be	 used	 in	 order	 to	 convince	 employers	 not	 to	 lay-off	 employees	(Hirsch	et	al.,	2010:	570–571).	If	works	councils	insist	on	the	seniority	principle	(Last-In-First-Out),	 then	 less	productive	 employees	might	 retain	 their	 jobs	 and	thus,	works	councils	might	be	seen	as	detrimental	 to	productivity.	Again,	 there	are	alternative	arguments	and	evidence	 in	 favour	of	 ‘institutional	 voice’	 effects	(Freeman	 and	 Medoff,	 1984)	 for	 works	 councils	 as	 well.	 In	 sum,	 the	 above	relationships	lead	to	the	formulation	of	the	following	hypotheses:	
H1:	Higher	levels	of	bargaining	in	European	workplaces	are	negatively	associated	
with	productivity	increases.		
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H2:	The	presence	of	trade	unions	in	European	workplaces	is	negatively	associated	
with	productivity	increases.		
H3:	The	presence	of	works	councils	(or	similar	bodies)	in	European	workplaces	is	
negatively	associated	with	productivity	increases.	
	
Workplace	practices	and	productivity	
A	 large	body	of	 literature	 looks	 into	 the	work	practices	 that	 contribute	 to	high	performance	in	organisations	(Appelbaum	et	al.,	2000;	Huselid,	1995).	Although	the	 links	 between	 progressive	 human	 resources	 (HR)	 practices	 and	 firm	performance	 resemble	 more	 of	 a	 ‘black	 box’,	 due	 to	 the	 various	 factors	 that	mediate	the	relationship	(Chowhan,	2016;	Hefferman	and	Dundon,	2016;	Jiang	et	al.,	 2013),	 it	 is	 largely	 acknowledged	 that	 ‘high	 road’	 HR	 practices	 may	 be	correlated	 with	 positive	 organisational	 outcomes.	 Hence,	 the	 HPWS	 literature	suggests	 that	 certain	 work	 practices	 have	 positive	 effects	 on	 individual	 and	group	 productivity,	 because	 they	 improve,	 among	 others,	 the	 organisational	climate,	 motivation,	 employee	 empowerment,	 loyalty	 and	 commitment,	 and	lower	 turnover	 rates,	 (Camps	 and	 Luna-Arocas,	 2009;	 Shin	 and	 Konrad,	 2014;	Tregaskis	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Although	 the	 ECS	 does	 not	 allow	 us	 to	 examine	 an	extensive	set	of	HR	bundles,	it	does	include	information	on	three	work	practices	that	are	usually	linked	to	high-road	HR	bundles:	PRP,	teamwork	and	training.		
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To	 begin	 with,	 performance-related	 pay	 (PRP)	 is	 usually	 associated	with	increased	 productivity	 (Huselid,	 1995).	 Although	 there	 is	 some	 debate	 in	 the	literature,	we	follow	those	approaches	that	include	performance-related	pay	as	a	core	part	 of	 high	performance	work	 systems	 (Chowhan,	 2016:	116;	Hefferman	and	 Dundon,	 2016:	 212;	 Posthuma	 et	 al.,	 2013:	 1192).	 The	 effect	 of	 PRP	 on	productivity	 may	 be	 direct	 or	 indirect.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 PRP	 is	 expected	 to	increase	employees’	productivity	by	altering	their	incentive	structures	and	elicit	more	 effort	 (Chowhan,	2016:	116).	On	 the	other	hand,	 it	may	act	 indirectly	by	attracting	 a	 more	 capable	 workforce	 (Lazear,	 2000).	 Either	 way	 the	 expected	outcome	is	increased	productivity.	
Second,	we	consider	teamwork	as	being	broadly	a	part	of	HPWS	practices	(Posthuma	 et	 al.,	 2013:	 1192).	 There	 are	 several	 reasons	 why	 teamwork	may	enhance	 productivity;	 employees	 may	 work	 smarter	 because	 they	 combine	different	problem-solving	skills	or	self-directed	 teams	may	be	more	efficient	as	some	 layers	of	supervision	and	middle-management	are	eliminated	(Delarue	et	al.,	2008:	130).	Another	 reason	might	be	 that	employees	may	voluntarily	work	harder,	because	of	peer-pressure	norms	(Tregaskis	et	al.,	2013:	228).	Overall,	a	meta-analysis	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 teamwork	 on	 organisational	 performance	 has	concluded	 that	 teamwork	 is	 generally	 associated	with	 enhanced	organisational	and	 individual	outcomes,	 although	 their	effects	may	be	 contingent	on	bundling	with	other	practices	(Delarue	et	al.,	2008).		
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Finally,	 training	 is	 typically	 included	as	a	part	of	 the	core	HPWS	practices	(Appelbaum	 et	 al.,	 2000;	 Camps	 and	 Luna-Arocas,	 2009:	 1061;	 Huselid,	 1995;	Posthuma	et	al.,	2013:	1192;	Shin	and	Konrad,	2014:	11).	Training	may	fill	skills	gaps	or	update	skills	through	formal	processes	of	training	needs	analyses.	Thus,	it	may	have	a	positive	impact	on	the	development	of	employee	knowledge,	skills	and	 ability	 to	 perform	 in	 their	 jobs	 (Jiang	 et	 al.,	 2013:	 1469).	 Another	way	 to	enhance	 productivity	 is	 through	 the	 development	 of	 problem-solving	 skills	(Tregaskis	 et	 al.,	 2013:	 227).	 Overall,	 this	 upgrading	 in	 human	 capital	 (or	upskilling)	 is	 expected	 to	 have	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 productivity.	 In	 sum,	 the	above	relationships	lead	to	the	formulation	of	the	following	hypotheses:	
H4:	 Performance-Related	 Pay	 (PRP)	 in	 European	 workplaces	 is	 positively	
associated	with	productivity	increases.	
H5:	 Teamwork	 in	European	workplaces	 is	positively	associated	with	productivity	
increases.	
H6:	 Training	 in	 European	 workplaces	 is	 positively	 associated	 with	 productivity	
increases.	
Data,	variables	and	methods	
To	 test	 the	 hypotheses	 specified	 above,	 we	 use	 data	 from	 the	 2009	 European	Company	 Survey	 (ECS),	 a	 survey	 of	 approximately	 27,000	 establishments	 that	took	place	between	January	and	May	2009	across	the	whole	EU-28	(plus	FYROM	
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and	Turkey).	TNS	Infratest	Sozialforschung	administered	the	survey,	on	behalf	of	the	European	Foundation	for	the	Improvement	of	Living	and	Working	Conditions	(Eurofound	 and	 TNS	 Infratest	 Sozialforschung,	 2010)	 and	 the	 overview	 report	was	published	on	30	May	2011	(Eurofound	et	al.,	2011).	
By	design,	the	universe	for	the	survey	only	includes	establishments	with	10	or	more	 employees,	 while	 it	 excludes	workplaces	 in	 Agriculture,	 Forestry	 and	Fishing	 (NACE	 Rev.	 1.1	 A	 and	 B),	 Private	 Households	 (P)	 and	 Extraterritorial	Organizations	(Q).	 In	our	analysis,	we	focus	our	attention	only	to	private	sector	workplaces	in	the	EU-15	countries.	Since	the	sampling	method	used	leads	to	an	over-representation	 of	 larger	 workplaces	 and	 those	 in	 smaller	 industries	 and	countries	in	the	final	sample	(Bryson	et	al.,	2012),	establishment	weights	that	are	provided	 with	 the	 dataset	 are	 used	 throughout	 our	 analysis.	 More	 technical	details	about	 the	survey	can	be	 found	 in	 its	Technical	Report	 (Riedmann	et	al.,	2009).	
In	 all	 establishments,	 an	 interview	 was	 conducted	 with	 a	 management	representative	 responsible	 for	 personnel.	 This	 interview	 provides	 a	 wealth	 of	information	 concerning	 workplace	 and	 workforce	 characteristics,	 collective	bargaining	and	employee	representation,	HRM/work	organization	practices	and	subjective	measures	of	workplace	performance.		
Following	the	classification	in	the	models	of	capitalism	literature	(Amable,	2003;	 Becker,	 2009)	 and	 the	 industrial	 relations	 regimes	 literature	 (Gumbrell-McGormick	and	Hyman,	2013;	Hyman,	2004),	we	categorize	the	EU-15	countries	
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in	four	clusters:	the	Southern	countries	(Greece,	Portugal,	Italy	and	France)2,	the	
Continental	 countries	 (Austria,	 Belgium,	 Germany,	 Luxembourg,	 and	 the	Netherlands),	 the	 Nordic	 countries	 (Denmark,	 Finland	 and	 Sweden);	 and	 the	
Liberal	countries	(Ireland	and	the	UK).	
Dependent	variable	
The	 dependent	 variable	 comes	 from	 the	 ‘Performance	 and	 Productivity	Indicators’	section	of	the	management	questionnaire	and	the	following	question:		
‘And	 if	you	compare	your	establishment’s	current	 labour	productivity	 to	 the	
situation	3	years	ago:	Has	it	increased	considerably,	has	it	slightly	increased,	
has	it	remained	about	the	same	or	has	it	decreased	since	then?’	
Using	these	answers,	we	create	an	ordinal	variable	 for	 labour	productivity	
changes	 that	 ranges	 from	 0	 (decreased)	 to	 3	 (increased	 considerably).	Consequently,	 an	 ordered	 probit	 model	 is	 used	 for	 the	 examination	 of	 the	productivity	change	variable.	An	alternative	measure	available	in	the	survey	asks	the	 management	 representative	 to	 subjectively	 assess	 the	 relative	 labour	productivity	 of	 the	 establishment	 compared	 with	 other	 establishments	 in	 the	same	sector.	We	judge	that	the	survey	respondents	are	more	likely	to	be	aware	of	 changes	 in	 labour	 productivity	 that	 took	 place	 in	 the	 recent	 past	 in	 the	establishment	 than	 about	 the	 establishment’s	 ranking	 in	 the	 sectoral	productivity	distribution.	 In	other	words,	productivity	change	 in	 the	past	 three	years	 is	 a	 better	 indicator	 of	 an	 informed	 managerial	 assessment	 of	
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establishment	performance.	Moreover,	 the	 independent	variables	of	 interest	 to	us	 (ER	 institutions	 and	 practices)	 are	 variables	 that	 can	 be	 considered	 as	relatively	constant	for	long	periods	of	time	in	the	same	establishment.	Hence,	any	biases	that	arise	due	to	the	fact	that	the	chosen	productivity	change	measure	is	regressed	on	variables	measured	in	the	current	period	should	be	relatively	small.		
We	 are	 also	 aware	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 use	 of	 subjective	measures	 of	workplace	 performance	 but,	 as	 Forth	 and	 McNabb	 (2008)	 and	 Bryson	 et	 al.	(2006)	 argue,	 so	 is	 the	 case	 with	 objective	 performance	 indicators;	 for	 this	reason,	 an	analysis	of	both	would	be	 the	most	appropriate	approach.	Yet	 since	objective,	 accounts-based,	 indicators	 are	 not	 available	 in	 the	 ECS,	 we	 proceed	with	 this	 subjective	 measure	 of	 productivity	 change.	 Note	 that	 a	 preliminary	examination	 showed	 that	 this	 measure	 is	 strongly	 correlated	 (and	 in	 the	expected	direction)	with	workplace	outcomes	also	available	 in	ECS	 that	 can	be	thought	as	intermediary	ones	(Forth	and	McNabb,	2008:	106),	such	as	employee	absenteeism	and	low	motivation.	This	provides	a	further	reassurance	that	we	are	indeed	examining	a	meaningful	measure	of	establishment	productivity.	
Independent	variables	
The	 bargaining	 level	 is	 measured	 using	 information	 from	 two	 questions.	The	management	representative	is	first	asked	about	the	percentage	of	employees	at	 the	establishment	 that	are	covered	by	a	collective	wage	agreement.	 If	 this	 is	zero,	 the	 establishment	 is	 coded	 as	 having	 ‘no	 collective	 bargaining’.	 If	 it	 is	
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greater	 than	 zero,	 a	 second	 question	 asks	 about	 the	 level	 at	 which	 the	negotiations	 take	place.	We	distinguish	between	 three	kinds	of	establishments:	those	 where	 bargaining	 takes	 place	 at	 the	 establishment	 or	 company	 level	(decentralised),	 those	 with	 higher	 level	 bargaining	 (centralised),	 i.e.	 regional,	sectoral	 or	 national,	 and	 those	 where	 both	 types	 of	 negotiations	 apply	 (two-tier).3		
Following	Bryson	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 for	 the	 coding	of	 the	 variables	 concerning	employee	 representation,	 we	 focus	 on	 institutional	 or	 statutory	 forms	 of	representation.	Hence,	we	distinguish	between	trade	union	(TU)	representation	and	works	councils’	 (WC)	representation,	based	on	 the	management	responses	about	specific	bodies	 that	are	available	 in	each	workplace	and	country	 (for	 the	specific	bodies	in	each	country,	see	Bryson	et	al.,	2012:	65–66).	Dummy	variables	are	 then	 constructed	 for	 TU-only	 representation,	WC-type-only	 representation	and	 both	 types	 of	 representation	 available	 at	 the	 workplace	 (the	 reference	category	is	the	absence	of	any	form	of	representation).	
To	test	our	hypotheses	concerning	workplace	practices,	we	code	a	dummy	variable	for	the	existence	of	performance	related	pay	schemes	in	the	workplace,	while	teamwork	is	measured	by	a	dummy	variable	that	takes	the	value	of	1	in	the	workplaces	where	the	management	representative	reported	that	work	in	teams	is	 an	 important	 characteristic	 of	 the	 work	 organization	 in	 the	 establishment.	Finally,	for	training	incidence	we	code	a	dummy	variable	that	indicates	a	positive	
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answer	to	the	question	whether	any	of	the	employees	have	been	given	time	off	in	the	past	12	months	in	order	to	undergo	training.		
However,	 the	 above	 independent	 variables	 of	 interest	may	 be	 correlated	with	 other	 observable	 workplace	 characteristics	 that	 determine	 establishment	productivity	 changes.	 For	 this	 reason,	 we	 further	 control	 for	 a	 range	 of	 such	characteristics,	 namely:	 establishment	 size	 (four	 dummies),	 industry	 (ten	dummies	 based	 on	 the	 NACE	 Rev.	 1.1	 one-digit	 codes)	 whether	 the	establishment	 is	 a	 branch	 of	 a	 company	 (and	 not	 a	 single	 independent	organization),	whether	it	is	foreign	owned,	the	proportion	of	female,	of	part-time,	of	highly	 skilled,	 and	of	 fixed-term	employees,	 the	existence	of	 a	profit	 sharing	scheme,	 a	 share	ownership	 scheme,	whether	 there	 is	 shift	working	patterns	 in	the	establishment,	whether	 there	are	any	employees	regularly	working	at	non-standard	 times/days	 (nights,	 Saturdays	 or	 Sundays),	 whether	 there	 was	 any	work	reorganization	in	the	last	three	years	(such	as	changes	in	the	remuneration	system,	in	the	organization	of	the	work	process,	in	working	time	arrangements,	or	 restructuring	measures),	 and	whether	 the	organization	was	 involved	 in	 any	acquisition,	 takeover,	 merger,	 relocation	 or	 demerger	 in	 the	 last	 three	 years.	These	 latter	two	variables	can	additionally	deal	 to	some	extent	with	any	biases	that	 may	 arise	 because	 of	 the	 reference	 of	 the	 dependent	 variable	 to	 what	happened	 in	 the	 past	 three	 years.	 Finally,	 country	 dummies	 that	 account	 for	common	unobserved	country	or	institutional	effects	are	also	included	in	all	our	estimated	models.4	
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After	 dropping	 observations	 with	 missing	 values	 in	 any	 of	 the	 variables	inserted	 in	 our	 model,	 we	 end	 up	 with	 a	 final	 sample	 of	 10,048	 observations	across	the	EU-15.	These	are	allocated	across	the	different	country	groupings	as	follows:	3,216	in	the	Southern	cluster,	3,462	in	the	Continental	countries,	1,992	in	the	Nordic	ones,	and	1,378	in	the	Liberal	countries.		
Results	and	discussion	
Descriptive	statistics	
Table	1	reports	the	distribution	of	our	dependent	variable	across	EU-15,	as	well	as	separately	for	each	country	cluster.	Most	establishments,	irrespective	of	country	 cluster,	 either	 report	 that	 productivity	 did	 not	 change	 during	 the	 past	three	years	or	 that	 it	 increased	 slightly.	However,	 significant	numbers	 are	 also	observed	 in	 the	 two	 extremes,	 and	 especially	 in	 the	 highest	 category	 of	 the	dependent	variable.	On	average,	the	best	performing	establishments	are	found	in	the	 Nordic	 countries	 (with	 64%	 of	 establishments	 reporting	 an	 increase	 in	productivity),	 whereas	 the	 worst	 performing	 ones	 are	 found	 either	 in	 the	Southern	or	the	Liberal	cluster	(with	only	around	50%	of	establishments	in	each	group	reporting	a	productivity	increase	in	the	past	3	years).		
[Table	1]	
To	begin	with,	we	 look	at	 the	distribution	of	 the	 independent	variables	of	interest.5	Table	2	presents	the	relevant	data.	Some	form	of	collective	bargaining	
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is	 quite	widespread	 across	 the	EU-15	private	 sector	workplaces,	 the	 exception	being	 the	workplaces	 in	 the	Liberal	 countries.	On	 the	other	hand,	most	private	sector	 workplaces	 (73%)	 in	 the	 EU-15	 have	 no	 institutional	 or	 statutory	recognized	 employee	 representation,	 either	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 TU	 and/or	 a	WC-type	 one.	 The	 exception	 to	 this	 pattern	 is	 the	 Nordic	 cluster,	 where	 TU-only	representation	 is	 relatively	 very	 widespread.	 Finally,	 training	 and,	 especially,	teamwork	are	quite	prevalent	across	 the	EU-15	(with	Liberal	countries	scoring	the	 highest	 incidence	 rates),	 something	 that	 is	 not	 the	 case	 for	 performance	related	pay	schemes.	As	a	whole,	 the	Southern	countries	record	the	(relatively)	lowest	prevalence	of	workplace	practices.		
[Table	2]	
	
Regression	results	and	discussion	
We	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 regression	 estimates.	 Table	 3	 reports	 the	 ordered	probit	 coefficients	 (and	 associated	 standard	 errors)	 of	 the	 productivity	 change	model.6	Two	specifications	are	reported,	both	for	EU-15	as	a	whole	and	for	each	country	 cluster:	 the	 first	 includes	 only	 the	 independent	 variables	 of	 interest	(along	 with	 country	 dummies),	 while	 the	 second	 adds	 the	 further	 controls	previously	 mentioned.	 While	 there	 are	 some	 slight	 differences	 between	 the	results	 from	 the	 two	 specifications,	 most	 of	 them	 are	 quite	 robust	 to	 the	inclusion	of	further	control	variables.	In	the	discussion	that	follows,	we	refer	to	
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the	 second	 specification,	 which	 deals	 to	 a	 greater	 extent	 with	 the	 substantial	heterogeneity	observed	across	EU	establishments.	Moreover,	 since	 the	ordered	probit	 coefficients	 and	 its	 standard	 errors	 can	 only	 indicate	 the	 direction	 and	significance	of	the	effect	of	independent	variables,	we	will	also	refer	in	the	text	to	some	marginal	effects	of	the	variables	of	interest.	The	marginal	effects	show	the	(ceteris	 paribus)	 change	 in	 a	 probability	 relevant	 to	 the	 estimated	 model	 that	results	 from	 changing	 an	 independent	 variable	 from	 the	 reference	 category	 to	the	category	of	interest	and	can,	thus,	provide	some	perspective	on	the	size	of	the	estimated	 associations.	 Throughout	 the	 paper,	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 probability	 of	reporting	the	highest	category	in	the	productivity	change	variable	(i.e.	‘increased	considerably’)	to	estimate	the	marginal	effects.7	
[Table	3]	
Across	the	whole	EU-15	we	find	little	support	for	Hypotheses	1-3.	Starting	from	collective	bargaining,	Hypothesis	1	finds	little	support	in	the	data.	For	EU-15	 as	 a	 whole,	 none	 of	 the	 bargaining	 level	 variables	 is	 estimated	 with	 a	statistically	 significant	 coefficient,	meaning	 that	 there	 is	 no	difference	between	any	of	them	and	the	reference	category	of	no	collective	bargaining.	However,	the	coefficient	 for	 decentralised	 (establishment	 or	 company)	 bargaining	 is	significantly	 higher	 than	 the	 one	 for	 centralised	 (higher	 level)	 bargaining	(p<0.01).	The	associated	marginal	effects	though,	do	not	show	a	very	substantial	difference:	there	is	an	approximately	two	percentage	points	(p.p.)	increase	in	the	probability	 of	 reporting	 the	 highest	 category	 of	 productivity	 change	 for	 the	
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managers	 in	 establishments	 with	 decentralised	 bargaining	 relative	 to	 an	establishment	with	no	bargaining,	while	 the	marginal	 effect	 for	 the	 centralised	bargaining	variable	shows	a	two	p.p.	decrease.	Considering	a	21%	probability	of	belonging	 in	 the	 highest	 category	 in	 EU-15	 (see	 Table	 1),	 these	 effects	 can	 be	thought	of	as	of	limited	substantive	importance.	
When	the	models	are	estimated	separately	for	each	country	cluster,	we	can	observe	some	further	interesting	results.	In	the	Southern	cluster,	we	do	not	find	any	difference	in	productivity	performance	across	establishments	with	different	bargaining	 regimes.	 In	 the	Nordic	 countries,	 establishments	with	decentralised	bargaining	 seem	 to	 perform	 (very	 slightly)	 better	 than	 those	 with	 centralised	bargaining,	but	none	of	 them	differs	relative	 to	 the	 ‘no	bargaining’	reference.	A	significantly	 negative	 (p<0.10;	 marginal	 effect	 -4.2	 p.p.)	 association	 with	centralised	 bargaining	 and	 productivity	 is	 observed	 only	 in	 the	 Continental	countries.	This	finding	appears	puzzling	given	the	trends	towards	derogation	in	collective	 agreements	 in	Germany	 (Hassel,	 2014)	 and	 elsewhere.	 Finally	 in	 the	Liberal	 countries,	 establishments	 with	 decentralised	 bargaining	 seem	 to	outperform	both	those	with	no	collective	bargaining	and	those	where	bargaining	is	conducted	at	higher	levels.	
There	 is	 also	 a	 variation	 of	 results	 across	 different	 country	 clusters	regarding	 employee	 representation,	 i.e.	 Hypotheses	 2	 and	 3.	 First,	establishments	with	TU-only	representation	are	significantly	related	with	lower	productivity	change	 than	comparable	establishments	with	no	representation	 in	
23	
	
the	EU-15.	However,	this	result	is	only	(marginally)	significant,	and	also	large	in	size,	 for	 the	 Continental	 countries.	 Considering	 that	 Austria,	 Germany	 and	Luxembourg	can	only	record	WC-type	representation	in	the	data	because	of	their	particular	industrial	relations	systems,	this	result	is	probably	driven	by	the	rest	of	the	countries	in	the	group	(Belgium	and	the	Netherlands).	
Second,	establishments	with	WC-type	only	representation	seem	to	perform	slightly	better	 than	other	 categories.	This	 is	particularly	 the	 case	 in	 the	Nordic	countries,	where	 the	associated	marginal	effect	 is	9.4	p.p.,	 a	particularly	strong	result.	 An	 exception	 to	 the	 overall	 pattern	 is	 the	 Southern	 cluster,	 where	 all	representation	 variables	 coefficients	 obtain	 a	 negative	 sign.	 However,	 these	coefficients	are	not	statistically	different	from	zero,	meaning	that	in	fact	there	is	no	 difference	 between	 different	 types	 of	 employee	 representation	 and	 no	representation	 in	 the	 European	 South.	 Finally,	 it	 should	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 no	significant	 relationship	 could	 be	 found	 between	 the	 different	 types	 of	representation	 in	 the	 Liberal	 countries.	 The	 apparent	 difference	 between	 the	WC-type	only	(or	both	types)	coefficient	and	the	TU-only	one	is	not	statistically	significant	at	any	conventional	level	of	significance.	
Overall,	 there	 is	 little	 support	 for	 our	 Hypotheses	 1-3	 and,	 therefore,	 for	conjectures	 suggesting	 union	 ‘monopoly	 effects’	 (Freeman	 and	 Medoff,	 1984;	Hayek,	 1990).	 The	 results	 on	 the	 whole	 suggest	 that	 there	 is	 no	 negative	association	 between	 ER	 institutions	 and	 productivity	 change.	 Even	 in	 the	Southern	 and	 Liberal	 institutional	 contexts,	 where	 unions	 are	 expected	 to	 be	
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more	 conflict-prone	 and	adversarial,	 there	 is	 no	negative	 relationship	between	unions	 and	 productivity.	 In	 Continental	 Europe	 unions	 appear	 to	 have	 some	negative	 association	with	 productivity,	 but	 this	 outcome	 appears	 also	 puzzling	considering	the	unprecedented	levels	of	wage	moderation	in	the	previous	decade	in	countries	like	Germany	(Hassel,	2014);	so,	we	suggest	this	might	be	driven	by	developments	in	Belgium	and	the	Netherlands.	
Across	the	whole	EU-15	Hypotheses	4-6	gain	support.	The	marginal	effects	in	Specification	(2)	 in	Table	3	 for	 the	whole	EU-15	sample	are	3.5	p.p.	 for	PRP,	3.9	 p.p.	 for	 training	 incidence	 and	 4.1	 p.p.	 for	 teamwork	 (p<0.01	 for	 all).	 This	confirms	 by	 and	 large	 the	 expectation	 that	 work	 organization	 matters	 for	productivity	 and	 competitiveness.	 As	 we	 discuss	 further	 below,	 this	 result	suggests	 that	 policies	 that	 focus	 on	 decentralizing	 bargaining	 or	 limiting	 the	power	 of	 unions	 at	 the	 workplace	 appear	 misplaced,	 whereas	 policies	 should	focus	on	work	practices	that	drive	productivity	improvements.	
When	 we	 shift	 our	 attention	 to	 country	 clusters,	 the	 picture	 suggests	 a	more	 diversified	 effectiveness	 of	 those	 practices.	 PRP	 seems	 to	 matter	 for	workplace	productivity	differences	in	the	Southern	countries	and	in	the	Liberal	countries.	 The	 latter	 makes	 sense	 in	 light	 of	 the	 literature	 that	 suggests	 that	variable	 pay	 is	more	 aligned	 to	 shareholder	 value	 corporate	 governance	 (Hall	and	Soskice,	2001)	and	has	been	rather	slow	to	penetrate	market	economies	in	Continental	Europe.	This	finding	for	Southern	Europe	might	be	explained	by	the	
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lack	of	any	particular	institutional	complementarities	in	this	model	of	capitalism	(Amable,	2003).	
Training,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 not	 a	 significant	 predictor	 of	 productivity	anywhere	 outside	 the	 Southern	 cluster.	 This	might	 appear	 puzzling,	 but	 if	 one	looks	 carefully	 at	 the	 phrasing	 of	 the	 question,	 it	 focuses	 on	 time-off	 that	employees	might	get	for	training	purposes.	Thus,	we	could	assume	that	training	might	be	a	built-in	characteristic	 in	the	Continental	and	Nordic	workplaces,	e.g.	on-the-job	 training	 through	occupational	 labour	markets	 (Streeck,	2005).	Thus,	time-off	 for	 training	 might	 matter	 in	 workplaces	 where	 embedded	 training	 is	limited,	as	in	Southern	Europe.	
Finally,	 teamwork	 is	 positively	 and	 strongly	 related	 to	 productivity	advantages	only	 in	 the	Nordic	and	 the	Southern	countries.	 In	Nordic	countries,	this	 seems	 to	 confirm	conventional	wisdom	on	 the	 importance	of	 teamwork	 in	Swedish	 work	 organisation,	 despite	 critiques	 that	 it	 might	 have	 been	exaggerated	in	the	literature	(Lorenz	and	Valeyre,	2005:	429).	On	the	other	hand,	the	importance	of	teamwork	in	Southern	countries	may	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	 any	 HPWS	 practice	 is	 likely	 to	 boost	 productivity	 in	 a	 context	 where	institutional	complementarities	are	absent.	
All	 in	 all,	 our	 results	 provide	mixed	 evidence	 concerning	 the	 hypotheses	posed	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 First,	 the	 hypotheses	 proposing	 a	 negative	association	between	ER	institutions	and	firm	competitiveness	are	not	supported.	It	would	be	fair	to	claim	that	ER	institutions	(collective	bargaining	and	employee	
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representation)	do	not	seem	to	have	been	behind	productivity	differences	across	EU-15	establishments	in	2009.	In	other	words,	higher	levels	of	regulation	neither	enhanced	nor	compromised	establishment	performance,	the	latter	being	proxied	by	 subjectively	 assessed	 productivity	 changes.	 It	 seems,	 however,	 that	 in	 the	Continental	 and	 the	 Liberal	 countries,	 establishments	 with	 lower	 levels	 of	bargaining	fared	somewhat	better	than	similar	ones	with	higher	level	bargaining.	This	finding	raises	some	interesting	questions	regarding	both	the	universality	of	the	 neo-liberal	 argument	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 institutional	 setting	 in	 the	potential	success	or	failure	of	such	policies.		
Our	conclusion	about	the	lack	of	evidence	regarding	the	validity	of	the	neo-liberal	 argument	 can	 be	 strengthened	 even	 more	 if	 we	 note	 that	 unobserved	differences	in	the	dynamism	of	establishments	might	play	a	role	in	the	results	we	obtain	 for	 the	 institutional	 variables.	 This	 is	 because	 more	 rapidly-growing	industries,	 firms	 and	 establishments	 (that	 also	 experience	 higher	 productivity	growth)	 may	 be	 associated	 with	 less	 ‘restrictive’	 workplace	 practices,	 such	 as	decentralized	 bargaining	 or	 no	 bargaining	 at	 all.	 In	 further	 checks	we	 tried	 to	account	to	some	extent	for	this	source	of	heterogeneity	by	additionally	including	in	 our	 models	 dummy	 variables	 indicating	 employment	 change	 (i.e.	 increase,	decrease	or	stability)	in	the	past	three	years.	One	can	expect	that	rapidly	growing	firms	 will	 record	 both	 high	 levels	 of	 productivity	 growth	 and	 employment	growth	 –	 although	 this	 is	 not	 a	 certainty,	 due	 to	 the	 complex	 relationships	between	the	two	variables.	We	do	indeed	find	evidence	that	productivity	change	
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is	 strongly	 and	 positively	 related	 to	 employment	 change.	 However,	 these	additional	controls	did	not	substantially	affect	the	estimates	of	our	independent	variables	of	interest,	hence	our	conclusions	remain	the	same.		
Second,	 the	 hypotheses	 proposing	 a	 positive	 association	 between	workplace	practices	and	firm	productivity	are	broadly	supported	for	the	EU-15	as	 a	 homogenous	 sample.	 However,	 when	 we	 examine	 the	 same	 variables	 for	different	institutional	contexts,	it	seems	that	some	practices	appear	more	related	with	productivity	 in	particular	models.	Teamwork	 is	particularly	 important	 for	the	Nordic	cluster	and	PRP	for	the	Liberal	cluster,	whereas	any	of	the	three	work	practices	are	important	for	the	Southern	cluster	and	none	for	the	Continental.	
Conclusion	
It	 is	 a	 commonplace	 for	 neoliberal	 policies	 to	 blame	ER	 institutions	 for	 having	detrimental	 effects	 on	 competitiveness.	 However,	 the	 evidence-base	 for	 these	claims	is	rather	weak	and	inconclusive	(ITUC,	2013).	To	shed	further	light	on	this	debate,	 we	 set	 out	 to	 examine	 whether	 European	 workplaces	 with	 ER	institutions	were	less	able	to	improve	productivity	during	the	crisis.	
We	 relied	 on	 establishment-level	 evidence	 drawn	 from	 the	 European	Company	 Survey	 2009.	 The	 data	were	 collected	 at	 a	 time	 that	most	 European	economies	were	in	their	deepest	slump	and	shed	light	on	the	above	relationships	during	 the	 crisis.	 We	 built	 hypotheses	 drawing	 on	 relevant	 theories	 from	political	 economy,	 industrial	 relations	 and	 HRM	 literatures.	 Empirically,	 our	
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findings	contribute	 to	 this	debate	by	examining	evidence	 from	a	pan-European	establishment	 level	 survey.	 Conceptually,	 our	 article	 contributes	 to	 this	 debate	by	combining	insights	from	the	literature	on	micro-level	work	practices	and	the	literature	on	macro-level	institutional	contexts.	
Contrary	 to	 the	dominant	neoliberal	discourse,	our	 results	 suggested	 that	ER	 institutions	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 any	 significant	 negative	 effect	 on	productivity	increases	across	EU-15.	Although	there	was	no	conclusive	evidence	showing	a	positive	or	negative	relationship,	these	results	cast	additional	doubt	to	the	 credence	 of	 neoliberal	 arguments,	 which	 are	 focused	 on	 dismantling	 ER	institutions	 to	 improve	 competitiveness.	 We	 also	 considered	 the	 alternative	hypotheses	that	‘high	road’	workplace	practices	(such	as	training,	teamwork	and	PRP)	 are	 positively	 associated	 with	 productivity	 increases.	 These	 hypotheses	were	confirmed	suggesting	a	strong	and	positive	effect	of	selected	work	practices	on	productivity	improvements.	
One	of	the	limitations	of	this	article	is	that	we	have	hypothesized	and	tested	only	 for	 a	 direct	 effect	 of	 institutions	 and	 practices	 on	 productivity	 change.	Hence,	we	 did	 not	 consider	 any	 ‘complementarities’	 between	 practices	 and/or	institutions,	 or	 the	 potential	 mediating	 role	 of	 ER	 institutions	 on	 the	 nature,	adoption	and	effect	of	workplace	practices.	Such	an	exploration	would	require	a	different	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 empirical	 modelling	 strategy	 and,	 hence,	was	 out	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 present	 paper.	 Nonetheless,	 these	 should	 open	 up	
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avenues	 for	 further	 research	 that	 is	 worth	 pursuing	 using	 comparative	 pan-European	large-n	survey	data.	
Finally,	 our	 results	 have	 implications	 for	 both	 policy	 and	 practice.	 They	suggest	that	the	policies	towards	deregulating	ER	institutions	appear	misplaced,	as	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 evidence	 to	 support	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	 ER	institutions	 and	 productivity.	 The	 focus	 on	 institutions	 tends	 to	 downplay	 the	role	of	other	factors	that	matter	for	competitiveness,	such	as	work	organisation	practices.	 Taken	 together,	 our	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	 continuation	 of	 the	neoliberal	‘low	road’	policies	in	the	advanced	industrialised	countries	of	Europe	is	 likely	 to	 have	 little	 effect	 in	 improving	 competitiveness.	 Instead,	 European	countries	and	firms	need	to	shift	attention	and	resources	towards	the	‘high	road’	to	competitiveness,	and	improve	productivity	by	enhancing	work	practices	that	overall	motivate,	enhance	skills,	and	 improve	the	effectiveness	of	 the	European	workforce.	
	
Notes
																																																								
1	EU-15	 consists	 of	 the	 fifteen	 EU	member	 states	 (Austria,	 Belgium,	 Denmark,	 Finland,	 France,	Germany,	 Greece,	 Ireland,	 Italy,	 Luxembourg,	 Netherlands,	 Portugal,	 Spain,	 Sweden,	 and	 the	United	Kingdom)	prior	to	the	accession	of	the	ten	candidate	countries	in	May	2004.	
2	A	 coding	mistake	 in	 the	 survey	did	not	offer	 the	option	 to	managers	 in	Spain	 to	 record	 trade	union	 presence	 in	 their	 workplaces	 (Bryson	 et	 al.,	 2012:	 31,	 fn.	 21).	 Thus,	 to	 avoid	 the	
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misclassification	of	Spanish	establishments	 in	 the	different	employee	representation	categories	we	decided	to	exclude	Spain	from	the	analysis.	
3	The	choice	of	bargaining	level	indicators	is	dictated	by	the	way	the	relevant	question	is	asked	in	the	 ECS:	 the	 respondents	 cannot	 distinguish	 among	 different	 types	 of	 higher	 level	 bargaining.	Moreover,	other,	more	qualitative,	aspects	of	the	practice	of	bargaining	that	may	be	thought	to	be	of	relative	importance,	such	as	the	degree	of	bargaining	coordination	within	and	between	sectors	and	firms	in	different	countries,	is	not	available	in	the	ECS.		
4	Modelling	 country-level	 heterogeneity	 with	 the	 inclusion	 of	 country	 dummies	 is	 the	 most	appropriate	choice	when	the	interest	lies	in	within-country	variation,	the	number	of	countries	is	small,	and	there	is	no	interest	in	and	explicit	modelling	of	country-level	variables	as	predictors	of	the	outcome	of	interest	(see	Bryan	and	Jenkins	(2016)	for	a	detailed	discussion).	As	a	robustness	check	 though,	 we	 also	 estimated	 model	 specifications	 without	 country	 dummies.	 The	 results	were	very	similar	to	the	ones	reported.		
5	Sample	means	for	the	rest	of	control	variables	are	available	from	the	authors	on	request.	
6	For	ease	of	exposition	only	the	results	for	the	variables	of	interest	are	presented.	Full	results	are	available	from	the	authors	on	request.	
7	For	each	marginal	effect	calculated,	the	rest	of	the	variables	are	set	at	their	sample	means.	
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Table	1:	Distribution	of	productivity	change	across	EU-15	establishments		
	
	 EU-15	 Southern	 Continental	 Nordic	 Liberal	
Productivity	in	last	3	years	 	 	 	 	 	Decreased	 0.14	 0.17	 0.11	 0.08	 0.16	About	the	same	 0.33	 0.32	 0.34	 0.27	 0.34	Increased	slightly	 0.33	 0.26	 0.38	 0.44	 0.31	Increased	considerably	 0.21	 0.25	 0.18	 0.20	 0.19	Observations	(unweighted)	 10,048	 3,216	 3,462	 1,992	 1,378		Source:	ECS	2009	and	authors’	calculations.		Notes:	 Numbers	 show	 the	 proportion	 of	 establishments	 giving	 each	 response	 for	 each	 country	 grouping;	 column	proportions	may	not	add	to	one	due	to	rounding;	weighted	data.			
Table	2:	Distribution	of	bargaining	level,	employee	representation	and	workplace	practices	
across	EU-15	establishments	
	
	 EU-15	 Southern	 Continental	 Nordic	 Liberal	
Employment	relations	institutions	 	 	 	 	 	
Collective	Bargaining	 	 	 	 	 	No	collective	bargaining	 0.31	 0.18	 0.27	 0.16	 0.65	Decentralised	bargaining		 0.28	 0.24	 0.32	 0.28	 0.25	Centralised	bargaining		 0.38	 0.53	 0.38	 0.51	 0.10	Two-tier	bargaining	 0.03	 0.06	 0.03	 0.05	 0.01	
Employee	Representation	 	 	 	 	 	No	employee	representation	 0.73	 0.68	 0.78	 0.45	 0.81	WC-type	representation	only	 0.15	 0.14	 0.19	 0.03	 0.12	TU	representation	only	 0.04	 0.02	 0.01	 0.40	 0.04	Both	types	of	representation	 0.08	 0.17	 0.02	 0.12	 0.03	
Workplace	Practices	 	 	 	 	 	Performance	related	pay	 0.36	 0.30	 0.41	 0.42	 0.37	Training	 0.64	 0.50	 0.70	 0.57	 0.75	Teamwork	 0.81	 0.71	 0.85	 0.83	 0.87	Observations	(unweighted)	 10,048	 3,216	 3,462	 1,992	 1,378		Source:	ECS	2009	and	authors’	calculations.		Notes:	Numbers	show	proportion	of	establishments	for	the	relevant	characteristic	and	country	grouping;	weighted	data.			
